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There is much confusion over what \hyperbolic discounting" means. I
argue that what matters is the use of relativistic instead of objective time,
not the shape of the discount function.
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hospitality.The term \hyperbolic discounting" comes up frequently nowadays in
economists's lunchtime discussions.1 Like \adverse selection" or \method of
moments" it is one of those ideas that we all think we should know about.
The idea of hyperbolic discounting, however, is easy to misunderstand. An
example that I will explain below is that the term is usually applied to
models that don't use hyperbolic functions for their discounting. There are
other sources of confusion too, which I will try to clear up. This note will,
I am sure, contain no single idea that is unknown to a great many scholars
who have thought hard about hyperbolic discounting. I nonetheless hope
that even those scholars could benet from reading this, and could make use
of this in explaining hyperbolic discounting to non-experts. For non-experts,
of course, I hope this note clears away the most common misperceptions.
First, I will explain what hyperbolic discounting is, and how it creates time
inconsistency. Then, I will try to clear up various confusions about it.
What Hyperbolic Discounting Is
People prefer to consume more now rather than more later. The stan-
dard way to include this in economic analysis is using a positive personal
discount rate in the utility function so consumption earlier adds more to
utility than consumption later. An example of such a utility function is:
U2008 = C2008 + f(2009)C2009 + f(2010)C2010 + f(2011)C2011; (1)
where the \discount function" is f(t) < 1 and f is declining in t. Or, we
could write the discounting in terms of per-period \discount factors" t < 1,
as in this example:
U2008 = C2008 + 2009C2009 + 20092010C2010 + 200920102011C2011: (2)
We could but need not assume a constant discount factor  and \discount








1Two overviews are the Frederick, George Loewenstein and Ted O'Donoghue 2002
article in the Journal of Economic Literature and the 2001 George-Marios Angeletos,
David Laibson, Andrea Repetto, Jeremy Tobacman and Stephen Weinberg article in the
Journal of Economic Perspectives. Those papers go into detail about motivations and
applications for hyperbolic discounting, something I will not do here.
2The functional form for discounting in equation (1) is perfectly general
(though of course the linear utility separable across time is special). The
functional form in equation (2), however, is an example of exponential dis-
counting. Exponential discounting's key feature is that the time subscripts
for the discount factors are absolute years, which I will denote by t, rather
than relativistic \years in the future", which I will denote by  (relativistic
because they depend on the year in which the person starts). As some would
put it, the dierence is between the date t and the delay . Because of using
relativistic discounting, if we view our person's decisions starting one year in
the future, at 2009 instead of 2008, his utility function will be:
U2009 = C2009 + 2010C2010 + 20102011C2011: (4)
The Time, t 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
The Discount Rate for t   1 to t,  | .10 .06 .05 .07 .07 .05
The Discount Factor for t   1 to t, t | .909 .943 .952 .935 .935 .952
The Discount Function for 0 to t, f(t) 1 .909 .857 .816 .763 .713 .680
Table 1: Exponential Discounting (to 3 decimal places)
A nice property of exponential discounting is that a person's consump-
tion path will be time consistent, meaning that if the person maximizes his




2011) then he will




his reduced wealth as the result of the consumption in 2008. The person
may regret consuming so much in the year 2008, so his decisions across time
are not consistent in the sense of being the choices he would make ex post,
but the 2008 consumption is a sunk decision by 2009 anyway.
An alternative way a person might have time preference is to have dis-
count factors whose levels depend not on the year itself{ 2008, 2009, 2010{
but on how many years in the future the consumption will occur{now, one
year from now, two years from now. Looking at the decision made in year 0,
the functional form could be exactly the same, e.g.
U0 = C0 + 1C1 + 12C2 + 123C3; (5)
where  < 1, using  now instead of t because time is now relativistic rather
than absolute. At time 1 ( year 2009) however, the person would maximize
U1 = C1 + 1C2 + 12C3, not U0
1 = C1 + 2C2 + 23C3.
The function in equation (5) is just one of many ways time preference
could be non-exponential, but whatever non-exponential form it takes, the





from the 2000 utility function will not match the optimal choices using the




For example, it may be that the person is expecting a big income bonus
in 2010. In year 2008, he might want to spread that income's consumption
between 2010 and 2011 because though he highly values year 0 consumption,
he is relatively indierent between years 2 and 3. By the time 2010 arrives,
however, year 2010 is year 0, and he would want to consume the entire bonus
immediately.
Hyperbolic discounting is a useful idea for two reasons. First, it can ex-
plain revealed preferences that are inconsistent with exponential discounting.
Second, and in my opinion more important, it can explain certain observed
behaviors such as people's commitments to future actions when other expla-
nations such as strategic positioning fail to apply, e. g., a person's joining a
bank's saving plan which penalizes him for failing to persist in his saving.
What Hyperbolic Discounting Is Not
4So much for what hyperbolic discounting is. What is it not? I will make
the following points:
(a) Hyperbolic discounting is not about the discount rate changing over time.
A constant discount rate is not essential for time consistency, nor does a
varying discount rate create time inconsistency.
(b) \Hyperbolic discounting" does not, as commonly used, mean discounting
using a hyperbolic function.
(c) Hyperbolic discounting really isn't about the shape of the discount func-
tion anyway.
(d) Hyperbolic discounting is not about someone being very impatient.
(e) Hyperbolic discounting is not necessarily about lack of self- control, or
irrationality.
(f) Hyperbolic discounting does not depend delicately on the length of the
time period.
(a) Hyperbolic discounting is not about the discount rate changing over time.
A constant discount rate is not essential for time consistency, nor does a
varying discount rate create time inconsistency.
Hyperbolic discounting makes not one but two changes from the stan-
dard model. First, it makes the per-period discount rate change over time.
Second, it bases discounting on relativistic time rather than absolute time. It
is this second assumption which is the key one. Both changes are necessary
conditions to generate time inconsistency. I view the second change as the
important one, though, because the assumption that the per-period discount
rate is constant is merely a simplifying assumption, not meant to change the
essential behavior of an economic model.
Comparison with interest rates on bonds is useful. We all know that
long-term and short-term interest rates are dierent, and there is a large
literature studying the term structure of interest rates, yet in most theoretical
models we assume a constant rate of interest, r. We do that not because we
think it realistic, but as a simplifying assumption, one that we often discard
when it comes to actual estimation.
5In the same way, there is no reason for us to think of a person's rate
of time preference, , as being constant, even in the standard exponential-
discounting model with absolute time. If I am planning for the consumption
of my 8-year-old daughter in 2008 I might use t = 10% for each year in the in-
terval [2008, 2015] and then use t = 5% for the interval [2015, 2025] because
I expect her degree of impatience to change. Doing so is still absolute-time
discounting. It would become relativistic-time discounting only if in each of
those 17 years I followed a policy of using 10% for whatever years were the 7
next years from the present and 5% for whatever years were the 8th to 17th
year from the present.2
People change as they get older. It is not implausible that I would use
a dierent rate of time preference at age 70 than at age 49. But that is
fully compatible with exponential discounting. The key is that exponential
discounting treats the parameter as \Rasmusen's rate of time preference for
when he is 70 in the year 2058" whereas non-exponential discounting treats
it as \Rasmusen's rate of time preference for 21 years from the present."
So long as the discounting uses absolute time, it will not give rise to
time inconsistency, even if the discount rate changes over time. In 2008 I
will be happy to have consumption from 2015 to 2016 discounted at a rate
of 5%, and I will be equally happy with that plan in 2014.
It is also true that if my per-period discount rate is constant then it
does not matter whether I discount using absolute time or relativistic time.
If I use relativistic time, however, the assumption of a constant per-period
discount rate is no longer just a simplifying assumption. It now becomes a
substantive assumption, one necessary to avoid the changes in behavior that
time inconsistency would bring.
(b) \Hyperbolic discounting" does not, as commonly used, mean dis-
counting using a hyperbolic function. The standard way to model hyper-
bolic discounting is with the \quasi-hyperbolic discounting" of David Laibson
(1997), which is simpler to use than a hyperbolic function and has similar
2 We would not even expect impatience to always decline, in the standard model.
Planning for myself, I might use t = 3% now, but t = 15% for the year 2058, when I
expect to be in my second childhood and barely aware of future consumption.
6properties, though it is not a special case of the hyperbolic function. Edward
Phelps & Pollack ( 1968) had used the quasi-hyperbolic form to discount gen-
erations of people over time. Laibson (1997) applied it to within the self and
named it \quasi-hyperbolic".3 True \hyperbolic" discounting, proposed by
Shin-Ho Chung & Robert Herrnstein (1961) in connection with a particular
theory of behavior, has similar qualitative features but is more complicated
to work with. Figure 1 shows how the shapes of the discounting over time
dier.
Figure 1:
3The term \subholic" has also been suggested, since the function lies below exponential
and hyperbolic discounting for small values of { see Figure 1.
7The Shapes of Exponential (solid), Hyperbolic (dotted), and
Quasi-Hyperbolic (dashed) Discounting
(exp = :92, fh() = 1
1+:1,  = :8 or H = 1:25 and qh = :96)
Exponential utility with a constant discount factor  has the form f(t) =
t:
U0 = C0 + C1 + 
2C2 + 
3C3 + :::; (6)
which has the per-period discount rate  = 1 
 .
Quasi-hyperbolic utility (also called \Beta-Delta Utility") has the form
f() = :
U0 = C0 + C1 + 
2C2 + 
3C3 + ::: (7)
with 0    1. This means that there is a lot of discounting from the present
to time 1 (discount factor  < , and per-period discount rate  =
1 
 ),
but after that the discount factor between any two adjacent periods falls to
a constant  (which is the per-period discount rate  = 1 
 ). And, of course,
this is relativistic-time discounting, so the date of \the present" is always
changing.
True hyperbolic utility has the form4 f() = 1
1+:










C2 + ::: (9)
Quasi-hyperbolic utility has some properties similar to hyperbolic utility, but
it is not a special case of it.
As with quasi-hyperbolic discounting, what is most important is that
hyperbolic discounting uses relativistic time in the utility function.






which has f() = e 
 as its limiting case as  goes to zero.
8All of these discounting functions are for use on the demand side, for
the utility function. The supply side, the budget constraint, would be the
same for all of them, and must use absolute time{ t, not , in the notation






























where W0 is the present value of wealth at time 0.
Any functional form for discounting except exponential discounting would
give rise to time inconsistency. The particular functional form does not mat-
ter much, except for simplicity. This is important because one might think
that hyperbolic discounting was a special case, which is false. Exponential
discounting is the special case. It would be better to use the term \nonex-
ponential discounting", but \hyperbolic" is what has become standard.
Hyperbolic discounting's functional form arises from the \Matching Law"
theory of decisionmaking. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting amounts to adding
to standard exponential discounting a parameter, , that makes the person
distinguish sharply between \Right now, time zero" and \All future times."
Its functional form in equation (7) can also be written as:
U0 = 
C0 + C1 + 
2C2 + 
3C3 + :::; (11)
with 
 > 0, where 
 = 1 for exponential utility, and where 
 > 1 for quasi-
hyperbolic utility. The marginal rate of substitution between consumption
at time 0 and time 0 is 
=, as opposed to the (1=)= from equation (7),
but they represent exactly the same consumer preferences.
I prefer form (11) to form (7), even though form (7) is standard. In
form (11), the parameter 
 represents what we might call \hyperbolicity"
and allows 
 to increase to innity; whereas in form (7) the parameter 
is declining in hyperbolicity, with a value restricted to be no greater than
1. Form (7) has the parameter  in every term, whereas in form (11) the
parameter 
 only has to show up once. For that reason, form (11) better
represents the intuition that the parameter concerns the specialness of the
present.
9(c) Hyperbolic discounting really isn't about the shape of the discount function
anyway. Rather it is about relativistic versus absolute time: how a person's
discount rate for a given time period changes as that time period gets closer.
At any one time, knowing the shape of the person's discount function for each
period's future consumption doesn't tell you whether he is using \hyperbolic
discounting" or not{ except for the special case in which his per- period
exponential discount rate is constant. This is really a reprise of point (b),
but I will expand on it here using examples.
It is easy to come up with examples where exponential and non- expo-
nential discount functions are identical.





which generates the numbers in Table 2.
The Time: t or  0 1 2 3 4 5 6
The Discount Function for 0 to t or : f(t) or f() 1 .91 .83 .77 .71 .67 .63
The Discount Rate for t   1 to t (or    1 to ): t or  | 10% 9% 8% 8% 7% 7%
The Discount Factor for t   1 to t, t | .91 .92 .92 .93 .93 .94
The Quasi-Hyperbolic Delta Parameter for t   1 to t:  | .96 .92 .92 .93 .93 .94
Table 2: Exponential Discounting with a Hyperbolic Shape (to 2
decimal places, f() = 1
(1+:1))
10An exponential utility function with the same shape can be derived






and since t = 1
1+t; we can calculate t = 1 t
t :
Similarly, we can nd a quasi-hyperbolic utility function with the same
shape if we are allowed to vary the  parameter. Let's set  = :95 We have











In equation (15) and Table 2 all but the rst of the  parameters are the
same for exponential and for quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
Note in Table 2 how the exponential discount rates are declining as time
passes. This is a general feature of the hyperbolic discounting function with
constant . It is not a characteristic of the quasi-hyperbolic discounting
function with constant , for which, of course, the discount factor is constant
at  after the rst period so the discount rate is also constant.
(d) Hyperbolic discounting is not about someone being very impatient. A
person can have high time preference even under standard exponential dis-
counting. The key to hyperbolic discounting is that the person's high rate of
discounting for a given future year's utility (say, utility in 2020) changes as
that year approaches.
In theory, hyperbolic discounting could result in negative time prefer-
ence, preferring future to present consumption. Someone might always care
little about the present year, but a lot about future years. This would be
one way to model a person who derives much of his utility from anticipation
of future consumption. Patience of this kind would introduce time inconsis-
tency too. In 2010 the person would want to consume a lot in 2015, but in
112015 he would prefer to defer consumption. Thus, the essence of hyperbolic
discounting is not excessive impatience.
Figure 1 illustrates something else about the dierence: although quasi-
hyperbolic discounting discounts the close future more than exponential does,
it discounts the distant future less. In Figure 1 the amount of discounting is
about the same at year 6, but the exponential utility function is more patient
at year 3 and less patient at year 30. Thus, the question of which kind of
discounting is more patient is ill- formed.
(e) Hyperbolic discounting is not necessarily about lack of self-control, or
irrationality. It is one way to model lack of self- control, to be sure, by
having 0 <  < 1 in the quasi-hyperbolic model. Lack of self-control is
just an interpretation of the equations, though, not a necessary implication,
and one might model lack of self-control in other ways. Also, non-exponential
utility can be used to model other kinds of behavior not involving self-control.
For example, we can imagine a person who is afraid of poverty more than 10
years in the future, but becomes braver as the poverty comes closer. Or, we
could simply take the preferences at face value.
The question of whether in a particular setting hyperbolic discounting
is being used to model (a) preferences that we usually don't assume in eco-
nomics, or (b) mistakes such as lack of self-control, is important, especially
for normative analysis. See Bernheim & Rangel ( 2008) or my own Rasmusen
(2008) for two attempts to grapple with welfare analysis when discounting is
hyperbolic. But although hyperbolic discounting does raise hard questions
for welfare analysis, the hardest questions do not arise because it implies
irrationality. Indeed, if we think of hyperbolic discounting as modelling ir-
rationality, the welfare analysis gets easier{ we simply try to undo the eect
of the mistakes.
The question of whether hyperbolic discounting is rational is separate
from the deeper question of whether discounting in general is rational or
moral. This is an open question in moral philosophy. Most modern economists
seem to agree that positive time preference is legitimate at the level of the
individual; most moral philosophers seem to agree that it is illegitimate (and
they even have doubts about discounting in general). See the references in
Rasmusen (2008) for entry into the philosophy literature. The issue of what
12the social discount rate should be is a separate one, which is even more
contentious, in both disciplines.
(f) Hyperbolic discounting does not depend delicately on the length of the time
period. Recall from equation (11) that a quasi-hyperbolic utility function
can be written in the more intuitive form:
U0 = H  C0 + C1 + 
2C2 + 
3C3 + :::;
There is a big dierence between the present and consumption at any
future time, but the units in which time is measured do not aect tradeos
between future time periods (though of course  has to be written in the
new time units too, so its value will change). For example, take a quasi-
hyperbolic discount function with  = :8 and  = :96 and units of one year.
The discount function will look like this:
Time: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Discount Function 1 .77 .74 .71 .68 .65 .63
Now change the time period to 2 years:
Time: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Discount Function 1 { .74 { .68 { .63
The discount function values stay the same. We'd just change to new =
2
old = :9216 to match the new time period.
Concluding Remarks
13Hyperbolic discounting is a useful idea for modelling people whose rate
of time preference is based on relativistic time{ distance in time from the
present{ rather than absolute time{ the date. As with discounting using
interest rates, we often model time preference with just one or two param-
eters but more realistically we should expect the rate of time preference
to be constantly changing, whether we use exponential discounting or non-
exponential. Such time preference is not necessarily irrational in the sense
of being mistaken, but hyperbolic discounting can be used to model either
someone whose preferences are based on relativistic time or someone who
wishes he had more self- control. Either way, it gives rise to time inconsis-
tency and can explain a variety of observed behaviors in which people try to
commit, constraining their future selves.
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